APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 498A IPC IN LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS

Introduction:

In the case of  Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., 2026 INSC 784, decided on 3 August 2026, the Supreme Court has delivered an important judgment on the applicability of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, to live-in relationships. The Court held that Section 498A can apply to a live-in relationship which qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage”, provided the requisite intention to marry is established. The judgment assumes particular significance because Section 498A expressly refers to the “husband or relative of the husband”. Therefore the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the expression “husband” must be confined strictly to a legally valid marriage or whether, in appropriate circumstances, it can extend to a relationship which possesses the essential attributes of marriage. The Court answered this question by adopting a purposive interpretation of Section 498A, keeping in view the object and legislative purpose of the provision as well as changing social realities.

Facts and proceedings of the Case in nutshell:

The proceedings arose from criminal complaints initiated by respondent No.2 against the appellant, Dr. Lokesh B.H. The parties claimed to have married according to Hindu customs and rituals on 17 October 2010 and thereafter resided together in Bengaluru. Their relationship subsequently deteriorated, resulting in criminal proceedings under Section 498A IPC and other penal provisions. The appellant approached the Karnataka High Court seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC. The appellant contends that they were not married at all and

as such no question arises regarding the application of Section 498A. Respondent No. 2, on the other hand, submits that they had been in a valid subsisting marriage and, therefore, all the Sections in which the appellant has been charged are actually maintainable. The High Court declined to interfere and held, inter alia, that the expression “husband” in Section 498A could receive a purposive interpretation in circumstances where the relationship bore the attributes of marriage. The matter consequently reached the Supreme Court.

Principal Question arose before the Court of consideration:

The principal question before the Supreme Court was whether the protective scope of Section 498A IPC could extend beyond a formally valid marriage to a relationship in the nature of marriage?.

Main submission of the parties:

The appellant contended that, being a penal provision, Section 498A must be strictly construed and the expression “husband” could not include a person who was not legally married to the woman. On the other hand, the respondents submitted that such a narrow interpretation would defeat the very object of Section 498A and allow a person who subjects a woman to domestic cruelty to escape criminal liability merely because the relationship did not satisfy the technical requirements of a valid marriage.

Strict Interpretation Does Not Mean Literalism:

The Supreme Court first considered the principle of strict interpretation of penal statutes and acknowledged that criminal provisions must be construed carefully, particularly because they affect personal liberty. However, the Court clarified that strict construction does not mean mechanical literalism or an interpretation that defeats the legislative purpose or produces an unreasonable result. While the language of a penal provision cannot be ignored or rewritten, its true meaning must be ascertained in the light of its context, object and legislative purpose. It was in this context that the Court proceeded to examine the mischief sought to be remedied by Section 498A IPC and the legislative purpose behind its enactment.

Object of Section 498A IPC:

Section 498A IPC was introduced in 1983 to address cruelty against women within the domestic and matrimonial setting and to deter conduct causing grave physical or mental harm, including conduct likely to drive a woman to suicide, as well as harassment connected with unlawful demands for property or valuable security. The Supreme Court emphasised that the object of Section 498A is not confined to dowry-related harassment. The statutory definition of “cruelty” is wider and encompasses both wilful conduct of the nature contemplated under clause (a) and harassment falling within clause (b) of the Explanation to the provision. The Court therefore held that the underlying object of Section 498A is to prevent and punish domestic cruelty, rather than to make such protection dependent solely upon the formal solemnisation of marriage.

Law Must Respond to Changing Social Realities:

A significant feature of the judgment is the Supreme Court’s recognition of changing social realities. The Court observed that live-in relationships have become a recognised social reality, particularly in urban areas and held that where the mischief sought to be addressed is domestic cruelty, the mere absence of a formal marriage cannot, by itself, determine whether a woman is entitled to protection. Cruelty does not become less serious merely because the parties are not formally married and the harm caused by domestic cruelty may be equally grave in a qualifying relationship in the nature of marriage. The Court therefore adopted an interpretation that advances the protective object of Section 498A IPC, rather than allowing its application to be defeated merely because the forms of intimate and domestic relationships have evolved with changing social conditions.

Relationship in the Nature of Marriage:

The Supreme Court, however made it clear that every live-in relationship cannot be equated with marriage. Referring to its earlier decisions in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal and Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, rendered in the context of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the Court explained that a “relationship in the nature of marriage” must possess substantial attributes of a marital relationship. The relevant factors may include the duration of the relationship, shared household, financial arrangements, domestic responsibilities, social representation of the parties, children, and the intention and conduct of the parties. Thus, a casual relationship, temporary cohabitation or a relationship lacking the essential characteristics of a marital or domestic partnership cannot, merely because the parties lived together, automatically attract the provisions of Section 498A IPC.

Constitutional Dimension:

The Supreme Court also examined the issue from the perspective of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The Court considered whether, for the purpose of protection against domestic cruelty, there was any rational basis for extending the protection of Section 498A to a formally married woman while denying the same protection to a woman in a qualifying relationship in the nature of marriage merely because the parties had not formally solemnised their relationship. The Court held that formal marital status, by itself, cannot constitute a rational basis for such exclusion, as the object of Section 498A is to prevent and punish domestic cruelty. The Court further drew upon the constitutional principles of personal autonomy, dignity, privacy and the right to choose one’s partner, recognizing that the decision of consenting adults to choose their partner and the manner in which they conduct their intimate and domestic life forms part of individual autonomy protected under Article 21.

Ratio of the Judgment:

The ratio of the judgment may be summarized in four important propositions. First, Section 498A IPC can apply to a live-in relationship where the relationship qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage”. Second, mere existence of such a relationship is not sufficient; the requisite intention to marry must also be established, and the initial burden of establishing such intention lies upon the woman seeking protection under Section 498A. Third, the purposive interpretation adopted by the Court is specifically confined to Section 498A IPC and does not mean that a person in a live-in relationship is to be treated as a legally wedded spouse for the purposes of every other statutory provision. Fourth, the extension of Section 498A to qualifying live-in relationships does not dilute the safeguards available to the accused; the principles laid down in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar must be strictly complied with, and there can be no automatic arrest merely because an offence under Section 498A has been registered.

Conclusion:

This judgment marks an important development in the law relating to Section 498A IPC and live-in relationships. By adopting a purposive interpretation, the Supreme Court has recognised that protection against domestic cruelty cannot depend solely upon the formal solemnisation of marriage. At the same time, the Court has consciously placed clear limits on the extension of Section 498A that every live-in relationship does not fall within its scope and the relationship must qualify as a “relationship in the nature of marriage” accompanied by the requisite intention to marry. Thus, the judgment expands the protective ambit of the provision without equating every form of cohabitation with marriage.

*****By Mahesh Tiwari Adv. Supreme Court of India